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1) GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Abstract 
The purpose of this work project is to analyze the acquisition of WhatsApp from Facebook occurred 
on 19th February 2014. The main research has the aim to understand if the price tag of $19 billion 
paid by Mark Zuckerberg was fair. Along the reaction of Facebook’s EPS on the keydays after the 
purchase, a balanced assessment of the acquisition was obtained and discussed. Results suggest that 
the price tag could be reasonable. However, taking into account the industry in which the two 
companies operate, where competition is quite intense, Facebook should assess this deal in a longer-















2) CASE NARRATIVE 
Technologies involved, Industry and Competition 
Social networking business area is becoming quite hard to successfully assess and predict, 
especially for new apps. This has a big impact on driving the change in M&A policy strategies.  
Early-stage startups, that show innovative platforms, are highly demanded and recent M&A  
announcements (such as WhatsApp and Facebook) are valid proofs. On the proposed deal, 
disruptive technologies were the key factors: rapid opportunities followed by short product 
lifecycles led to a constant innovation. Social softwares, mobile platforms and new developments in 
cloud were the most involved sensor technologies at the time of WhatsApp’s acquisition. Social 
networking competition was strongly dense, and making an industry analysis assumes a crucial 
importance in order to judge if the price tag paid by Zuckerberg was fair or not. 
Facebook operates in the Global Internet Media Industry. Mobile.app segment is a fundamental 
innovation engine within this industry. In fact, it attracts lot of M&A activities and competitive 
private financing. According to Bloomberg, total advertising revenues are constantly increasing 
over the years. Global advertising revenues were $494.58 billion in 2013, showing an increase of 
7.26% compared to 2011. A consistent portion of this amount came from U.S. advertising revenue 
($181.21 billion in 2013). In addition, internet advertising revenues were $118.43 billion in 2013 
(4.1% more than 2011). They are mainly generated by North America ($45.46 billion), EMEA 
($35.25 billion), Asia-Pacific ($33.57 billion) and Latin America ($4.15 billion). Industry forecast 
expects global advertising revenue to reach $605.88 billion on 2016. (see Exhibit 1) 
By analyzing the market share segment, competition is quite high. Performance of Internet Industry 
over recent years might be supported through the strong increase of social media companies which 




net income by 310% to $58 billion ($16 billion will just come from social media enterprises) by 
tripling their revenues on 2018. Global internet advertising revenues per market shares are primarily 
driven by Google, Yahoo and Facebook. According to Bloomberg, total revenues for Global 
Internet Media Industry accounted to $348.61 billion on 20th December 2014, while industry 
revenues were $95.18 billion on the same date. P/E ratio was 25.47. Google and Microsoft, with 
respectively $285.28 and $314.29 billion, showed the higher market capitalization in their industry. 
On 20th December 2014, Facebook accounted for $175.90 billion, while Tencen, BADU, Yahoo, 
SoftBank Group were a little more down the ranking. Google and Tencent had the higher industry 
revenue ($38.08 and $6.12 billion respectively). On 20th December 2014, Facebook, with $5.93 
billion was ahead Microsoft and Yahoo ($5.35 and $3.52 billion respectively). (see Exhibit 1) 
The Acquiring Company 
Facebook Inc is the world’s top social network which roughly had 1.2 billion users at the end of 
2013. The company held by Mark Zuckerberg had a strong start on 2014 looking at its first three 
quarters’ reports. As its CEO announced on the Q3’ 2014 press release, Facebook was continuing  
to widely expand its large community in size and engagement through 1.35 billion people that were 
using the service each month (64% of them per day) and 1.12 billion enjoying the social network 
from their mobile (703 million of them are daily users). Facebook’s total revenues are strongly 
increasing year-over-year. In fact, on the third quarter of 2014, they reached $3.20 billion: 58.88% 
and 153.80% more if compared to 2013 and 2012 previous third quarters respectively. More than 
three quarters of Facebook’s annual revenue came from USA, Canada and Europe. Furthermore, 
Facebook increased its revenue growth rate and expanded its operating margins by delivering free 
cash flow of $765 million and working capital estimated to be $14.88 billion. Finally, the company 
held by Zuckerberg continued to make considerable investments to ensure itself a long-term climb 




amount very close to $3 billion (according to Q3’ 2014). Facebook’s four geographic regions (USA 
and Canada, Europe, Asia and the Rest of the World) grew almost 64% over the years. (see Exhibit 2) 
At the time of WhatsApp’s acquisition, the real valuation of Facebook was more than the $90 
billion which emerged through its IPO (May 2012). Prior to the IPO, Facebook’s market 
capitalization was $104 billion performed on an user base of roughly 900 million customers. 
Morgan Stanley led Facebook’s initial public stock offering by selling $16 billion shares through a 
valuation of about $100 billion. Facebook went public at $38 per share, but it traded below the IPO 
price for more than one year. Afterwards, Facebook shares highly rose between the end of 2013 and 
the beginning of 2014. Indeed, shares were up 26% until the time of WhatsApp’s purchase and 
doubled along the past 12 months. Facebook, on 19th February 2014, was valued $173.5 billion: 
$130.15 per user given a monthly active user base of 1.23 billion. (see Exhibit 3) 
Analyzing the financial and business model of the Target Company 
WhatsApp was founded in 2009 by Yahoo’s executives and engineers Jan Koum and Brian Acton. 
The company carried all its development work in Russia at a cheaper value. WhatsApp made a 
popular smartphone application that provided users to send texts and pictures along cellphone 
broadband without paying the standard SMS fees. WhatsApp employed 55 people of which 32 were 
engineers (one engineer supported 14 million active users). At the time of the deal, the server 
processed 53 billion daily messages (19 billion sent plus 34 received) across seven platforms. By 
2011, WhatsApp’s users were sending more than one billion daily messages. Furthermore, unlike 
their competitors, Jan Koum did not spend any dollar on marketing advertisements. The service was 
free to use for the first year and then it charged $0.99 ($1) a year. On July 2013, WhatsApp’s value 




Taking into account WhatsApp’s business and financial model, it is quite important to underline 
that the company had only 55 employees at the time of the acquisition. Even if anyone would take a 
salary of $250.000 per year, WhatsApp would spend only $13.75 million on employees’ costs each 
year. The most expensive part of WhatsApp business and financial model was tied to the cost of 
storing and processing all the messages that were frequently sent and received through its platforms. 
By proceding per comparables, Facebook, which roughly 800 million users, spent about $860 
million for hosting the data. On Twitter, that had half of WhatsApp’s users, hosting costs had an 
impact of $130 million in 2012 ($0.70 per user). In WhatsApp, annual hosting costs probably would 
be about $150-$300 million (from $0.30 to $0.70 per user): comparing them to the already known 
$450 million in revenues, they may erode most of WhatsApp’s net income. In the proposed 
business and financial model, cash expenses were supposed to be around 25%. Employees’ salaries 
were assumed to remain constant over the time to $250.000 a year per person (taking into account 
that the company will continue to operate on a fixed basis of 55 employees). Additionally, working 
capital and capital expenditures were 5% and 10% respectively. WhatsApp had more than 450 
million monthly average users (70% of them active by day) at the time of Facebook’s acquisition. 
The industry standard was between 10% and 20%, with only a small number of enterprises above 
50%. The company stated that its user base had more than doubled last year and will continue to 
increase at least one million every day. On the other hand, Facebook’s active users were 1.23 billion 
but with a lower engagement rate (62% daily users). On November 2013, when WhatsApp had 350 
million active users, it was valued $11 billion by Exhilway Global CEG. Twitter had more than 500 
million active users and was valued approximately $20 billion. (see Exhibit 4) 
Rational of the deal: general synergies 
An acquisition is the action through a company (acquiring company) buys most (if not all) of the 




retains its name whereas the acquired firm ceases to exist. Acquisitions are often made for a need of 
raising money or issuing new shares or both of them. Acquisitions must be approved by 
shareholders of the acquired firm. A synergy can be viewed as the additional value which comes 
from combining two companies in order to generate a new more valuable entity. The main idea of 
synergy refers to the concept that the value of two combined entities would be greater than the sum 
of the two separate companies. Indeed, the synergy resulting from an acquisition is expressed by: 
Synergy = VAB – (VA + VB) 
Synergies might be attributed to various factors: a need of revenue enhancement (increase in 
customers and/or market power), cost reduction (economies of scale and/or scope, inefficiencies, 
replace ineffective managers), capital tax gains, combining talent and technology. Generally, 
Company A (the acquiring company) offers to Company B (acquired company) a Pb  for 100% of 
B’ s shares. Gains for Company B’ s stockholders are expressed through the “acquisition premium”: 
Acquisition premium = PB – VB 
On the other hand, gains for the stockholders of Company A are: 
Gain A = Synergy – Acquisition premium = VAB – (VA + VB) – PB – VB = VAB – VA – PB 
On the whole, Pb divides the synergy among the two parties.  
Coming back to Facebook-WhatsApp deal, it is deeply important to compare what Facebook gained 
by issuing additional shares versus what Zuckerberg’s company already had into pocket. Synergy 
analysis showed that prior WhatsApp’s acquisition was performed, Facebook counted about 2.55 
billion shares. Afterwards, the firm roughly issued other 230 million shares (market price of $15.8 
billion) to acquire WhatsApp. All this led to $173.5 bilion of market capitalization for Facebook. In 
addition, through the issue of $15.8 billion in new shares, WhatsApp’s users were acquired roughly 




$130.15. But where did $19 billion come from? Firstly, the answer should consider the will of 
Facebook to enhance its customers and market power level within the Global Internet Media 
Industry: WhatsApp, at the time of the deal, could offer Facebook a high fixed revenue stream over 
the years. Secondly, the ambition to well combine those talents and technologies (intangible assets 
such as goodwill, brand recognition, intellectual property) that only WhatsApp had at the time of 
the deal.  According to Bloomberg, Facebook was valued $158 billion on December 2013, ($126.4 
per user), on a basis of 1.2 billion users. Considering this price per user and adding 450 million new 
users to those already existing on Facebook, $19 billion can be fairly reached. And what about the 
value of the synergy created? The only fair way to estimate the synergy amount is to apply a 
formula where synergy value equals Facebook’s ΔNPV which is expressed as Facebook’s market 
capitalizations occurred in the different time periods before and after the deal: (see Exhibits 6, 7, 8) 
ΔNPV = Synergy 
Facebook Market Cap (20/02/2014) – Facebook Market Cap (19/04/2014) = Synergy 
$176.88 B - $173.5 B = $3.38 B 
Thus, the value of the synergy was more than $3.38 billion. By applying the same reasoning above, 
it is possible to calculate the synergy value on longer time horizons (supposing on a five days basis) 
by computing Facebook’s different market capitalizations. According to Bloomberg the following: 
Facebook Market Cap (24/02/2014) – Facebook Market Cap (14/04/2014) = Synergy 
$179.80 B - $170.42 B = $9.38 B 
In this case, longer the time horizon (prior and subsequent to the deal) wider the difference in 
market capitalization for the acquiring company. Finally, the adopted formula, which equals 
synergy value and ΔNet Present Value, does not consider the cost effect ($19 billion price tag paid 
by Facebook). In order to conclude a synergy analysis, Facebook’s shareholders should be 




increase on the value of shareholder’s stock) when the acquiring company purchases a business at a 
fundamental value lower than the tag price paid. Indeed, the value of long-term Facebook’s 
shareholders  is consistent with the opportunity to share future WhatsApp’s earnings and dividends.  
Intrinsic value  = Market Cap + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest + Total Debt – Cash & Equivalents – Adjustments 
Intrinsic value (or fundamental value) equals the enterprise value. According to Bloomberg, 
Facebook’s intrinsic value prior to the acquisition was $160.09 billion. Considering the PV of 
WhatsApp’s future earnings, which is the price tag paid by Facebook, it is possible to get the related 
value that takes into account the deal. On the other hand, the value that does not rely on the deal is 
expressed through the ratio between Facebook shares’ market price and Facebook’s market cap. 
prior to the deal: thus, Facebook’s shareholders value is expecting to rise 2.53% in the long-term: 
Value for shareholders = (Value with the acquisition) / (Value without the acquisition)  
                                               (1 + (PV WhatsApp future earnings / Facebook intrinsic value))   
                                               (1 + (Facebook shares market price / Facebook Market Cap))        
                                                (1+ ($19 B / $160.09 B))   
                                               (1+ ($15.8 B / $173.5 B)) 
                                      = 1.0253 = 2.53% 
The deal and the price paid by Facebook: the WhatsApp valuation 
There are two different approaches to perform company’s value: WACC and APV.  
On the one hand, WACC requires several assumptions to estimate the company cost of capital: 
capital sources such as common stocks, preferred stocks, bonds and other forms of long-term debt 
are considered in. Taking all factors equal, an increase in WACC leads to a higher risk and a 
subsequent decrease in valuation. WACC equation is represented by the costs of each component of 
capital times their proportional weights:  




where Re is the cost of the equity, Rd is the cost associated to the debt, E is the firm’s equity market 
value, D is the firm’s debt market value and V is the enterprise value obtained by summing debt and 
equity (D+E). Tc is the corporate tax rate: For reaching the Net Present Value (NPV), companies 
usually discount their cash flows at WACC. This is called Discounting Cash Flow method (DCF): 
NPV = Present Value (PV) of Future Cash Flows discounted at WACC 
The weighted average cost of capital is adopted when the capital structure of the acquiring company 
is fixed and the project does not have identifiable incremental debt. It is simple to use since it 
involves in few calculations and is more suitable for simple projects and/or small firms. WACC is 
more reasonable for projects where the separate computation of tax shield is not significant. Correct 
WACC estimation implies a previous knowledge of equity’s market value, cost of debt and equity. 
On the other hand, APV is more suitable for large firm’s projects. It is more more robust than 
WACC since it needs less assumptions. A correct use of APV occurs when the project’s debt/equity 
ratio is not constant because it may change its capital structure. Finally, APV is widely 
recommended when projects have an identifiable incremental debt and tax shield is not stable. In 
order to successfully figure out a fair valuation of WhatsApp, DCF method (using WACC as 
discount rate) seems to be the most suitable approach. WhatsApp was a small firm (with a very 
simple project) and it had a fixed capital structure. Taking into account again the business and 
financial model previously described in the paragraphs, it is possible to reach roughly $22.40 billion 
in WhatsApp’s valuation, an amount very close to what Zuckerberg paid to Koum. The two key 
assumptions in order to perform this Corporate Valuation analysis are represented by the terminal 
growth rate (g) and the discount rate (d). Only by adopting these two factors, and then combining 
them to more than 2 billion users until 2023 (90% of them are paying users), the price tag paid by 
Facebook’s CEO can come out. The main idea behind this analysis is to value WhatsApp on a 
stand-alone basis, and, consequently reaching the Net Present Value (NPV) by discounting all 




determined through the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) equation since WhatsApp was a 
private company prior being acquired by Facebook. In order to figure out a correct WACC the risk 
free rate, the market risk premium and the Beta (by using a sample of 20 WhatsApp’s comparables) 
were estimated:  
WACC = risk free rate + (β x (risk premium))  
According to Bloomberg, in USA, on 19th February 2014, market return and risk free rate were 
10.17% and 2.74% respectively. Thus, the market risk premium was by difference 7.43%. Also, 
considering that American market risk premiums on 31th December 2013 and 31th March 2014 were 
respectively 6.75% and 7.36%, it is possible to plot a linear graph between these 3 month data 
points in order to reach again 7.43% of market risk premium. Furthermore, on 19th February 2014, 
WhatsApp had 20 comparables: by exploiting an arithmetic average among them, the Beta adopted 
in CAPM equation is equal to 0.94 which in turn leads to a WACC of 9.72% presented below: 
WACC = 2.74% + (0.94 x (7.43%)) = 9.72% 
Finally, the terminal growth rate (g) assumed to value WhatsApp was 5%. The use of a correct 
WACC is deeply important since a too low discount rate (d) might cause an overvaluation in the 
NPV of the company under analysis. A discount rate of roughly 10% should ensure a good 
equilibrium allowing WhatsApp to not be overvalued in the long term way. Looking to the price tag 
paid by Facebook to purchase WhatsApp ($19 billion), the main conclusion is that WhatsApp was 
not overvalued and Facebook did not overpay. Morgan Stanley’s analysts estimated that WhatsApp 
would been able to reach more than 2 billion users by generating an ARPU (average revenue per 
user) of $2.50 on 2021 at 80% margin of user paying. This analysis was supported by the prediction 




than $1 billion by 2017. Analysts were definitely bullish in estimating ARPU level, supposed to 
reach $3 in 2023. Consequently, EBIT margin will be extremely high (58% in 2023). (see Exhibit 4) 
Aswath Damodaraw, a finance professor at the Stern School of Business of New York, stated: 
“Normally, for a company to warrant a $19 billion value, it would need to generate about $1.5 billion in 
after-tax income. WhatsApp is nowhere near that.”    
Considering the WACC adopted in the valuation (9.72%), the price tag paid by Facebook 
($19billion) and assuming a waiting period of five years prior to the steady state (the time before 
future cash flow income will be delivered), it is possible to obtain the amount below: 
After Tax Breakeven Income in steady state = WACC x Purchase Price x (1 + WACC)5  
After Tax Breakeven Income in steady state = 9.72% x $19 B x (1 + 9.72%)5 = $2.94 B 
The amount obtained ($2.94 billion) almost doubled the minimum threshold set at $1.5 billion.  
Financing the deal: how did Facebook pay for the deal? 
Generally, an acquisition can be performed through three different types of payments: all-cash 
acquisition, all-stock acquisition, or both of them. 
In an all-cash acquisition, the buyer gives target’s shareholders a stipulated price per share in cash. 
This involves in many advantages for the takeover firm. Firstly, the transaction is more efficient and 
transparent. Secondly, the acquiring company’s shareholders catch the synergy all for themselves as 
well as guaranteeing their control. Thirdly, an all-cash acquisition signals the market that the 
acquirer truly believes that synergies might be obtained. On the other hand, there are many 
disadvantages by adopting this approach: target shareholders are obliged to pay taxes on capital 




vacillate due to the wide lump sum paid either in debt or cash. All-cash acquisition can cause high 
agency costs (in the form of indirect bankruptcy costs) and a burden for the acquirer’s shareholders.  
Conversely, in an all-stock acquisition, synergies are split between the acquirer and the target firm. 
Additionally, this M&A payment structure avoids all the tax refunds tied to all-cash acquisitions, 
but shareholders of the target company may not necessarily hold acquirer’s shares. An all-stock 
acquisition signals the market that the acquirer perceives that the target is overvalued and synergies 
are somewhat in doubt (the acquirer does not believe in the synergy). The main issue in an all-stock 
acquition is represented by the effects associated to the acquirer’s EPS that makes an acquisition 
accretive or dilutive. The aim is to offer to the target firm a price in a way that the price-to-earnings 
ratio of the latter is less compared to the acquirer: this will guarantee that the deal will be accretive 
in a long-run perspective. An all-stock acquisition implies gains on tax shield (that leads in turn the 
transaction to be less dilutive) and to escape capital gain taxes for the seller. If a company overpays 
an acquisition, the overprice is easier to hide if the acquirer will pay it in stock rather than in cash. 
Facebook acquired WhatsApp for approximately $16 billion, including $4 billion in cash plus 
183,865,778 shares of Facebook Class A common stock (worth $12 billion based on the average 
closing price on February 10th 2014, or $65.2650 per share). Generally, Class A shares were 
accompanied by more voting rights than Class B shares. Additionally, the agreement between the 
two companies allowed for 46,966,444 RSUs in restricted share units (worth $3 billion based on the 
average closing price on February 10th 2014, or $65.2650 per share) to stump up to WhatsApp’s 
employees on the next four years: this translated into $345.5 million per person. On 17th February 
2014, Facebook had 2,551,654,996 Class A and B shares outstanding plus roughly 139 million 
dilutive securities. The Class A common stock and RSUs issued represented 7.9% of Facebook 




This analysis underlines that Facebook paid WhatsApp almost in stocks. This “strategy” made 
definitely sense since Facebook perceived itself to be overvalued. By widely swelling the value of 
its stocks, Zuckerberg was able to save money from the overall transaction outlay. Additionally, 
when a company seems to pay too much or people may think that the target company is overpriced 
by the takeover firm, the overprice is easier to hide for the latter if it is paid basically by stocks.  
How did Facebook’s stock react on the keydays following the deal? 
By paying almost in stocks, Facebook allowed WhatsApp to avoid capital tax gains and to share 
future gains (target shareholders can partecipate in future stock’s price appreciation). Generally, 
after an acquisition among two enterprises a predictable short-term effect modifies the stock price 
of both firms. Usually, the stock price of the acquiring (or bidder) company will fall, while the 
acquired (or target) company’s stock will rise. The reason related to an increase in target company’s 
stock price is mainly attributable to a premium paid by the bidder company in order to entice 
target’s shareholders to sell. Furthermore, acquiring company’s stock goes down for several 
reasons. In fact, the acquirer company (or takeover company) has to face some complications 
during an M&A transaction which can cause a decrease in its stock prices such as: more expenses 
due to the purchase of the target company, accounting issues (like goodwill) that debilitated its 
financial position or difficulties to well hold up different workplace cultures in an unique company.  
Agrawal et al. (1992) in an analysis related to the post-merger stock performance used a large 
sample of mergers along a 30-years period coming to the conclusion that the takeover firm 
statistically suffers considerable losses of approximately 10% along a 5- years postmerger phase1.  
On 19th February 2014, the day the deal was announced, Facebook’s share-price was $68.50. In few 
hours, after the acquisition was completed, shares in Facebook decreased by 4.8% to $64.80 closing 
                                                          
1
 Gopalaswamy Arun Kumar (India), Acharya Debashis (India), Malik Jaideep (India). 2008.  “Stock price reaction to merger   




to $68.06 on the Nasdaq. The acquisition made Facebook’s investors insecure when their shares 
went initially down. Facebook’s shares slid by 2.64% (or $1.82) to $66.24 in a hour of trading after 
it declared to buy WhatsApp. Earlier, on 20th February 2014, stock had a slight recover to $69.08. 
Subsequently, shares of Facebook rose by 2.3% to a final daily value of $69.63. (see Exhibit 5) 
What happened to Facebook’s EPS and cash flows on the quarters following the deal? 
Additionally, EPS is an important phenomenon tied to future share prices performance. Generally, 
as for stock prices, EPS might go down or up after an acquisition. Accretive and dilutive acquisition 
strongly depends on EPS performance. An accretive acquisition is tied to an increase in takeover 
company’s earnings per share, while a dilutive one tends to decrease its earnings per share. The 
general rule stated that an acquisition is accretive if the bidder firm’s EPS is less than the target’s. 
Coming back to Facebook’s deal, WhatsApp did not have neither EPS and P/E ratio because it was 
not a public company at the time of the acquisition. The only rational way Facebook could proceed 
was to simply add its earnings to WhatsApp’s and then dividing them by the new number of shares. 
EPS decreased because WhatsApp at that time did not have lot of profits compared to Facebook’s. 
In fact, the 230 million issuance of new shares (market price of $15.8 billion) shares caused dilution 
to the existing 2.55 billion Facebook’s shares: indeed, company’s future earnings were divisible by 
2.78 billion and not by 2.55 billion anymore. Additionally, a second aspect to mention is the 
overvaluation of the acquiring company’s stocks: in this hypothesis EPS should go down as well. 
Looking to Facebook’s EPS on the keydays following the deal and to its first quarter results, it 
decreased from 0.72 to 0.59 on the keydays subsequent to the acquisition, and it closed to 0.25 on 
31st March 2014 (Q1 2014): thus the acquisition was dilutive. However, two important outputs 
came from this analysis. The first one, is referred to the consideration that Facebook’s stockholders 




low amount with the main goal to sell them at a higher amount in the future. But, on the other hand, 
Facebook was definitely smart to overvalue its shares in order to keep on the table more money to 
guarantee itself WhatsApp’s purchase. On 19th February 2014, the deal diluted Facebook’s Non-
GAAP EPS by roughly 8% (from $1.72 to $1.59). However, since WhatsApp was a growth firm, 
the variation in Facebook’s EPS was slightly immediate as for stocks’ performances: (see Exhibit 5)  
Brian Novak, analyst at Susquehanna International Group stated: “There is no denying this deal will be 
dilutive, as we estimate it will impact our 2015 EPS estimate by 5%.” 
Holding stock prices constant, P/E ratio and EPS appear to be inversely related. In fact, a price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratio is the current stock price divided by annual earnings per share (EPS). Following 
a decrease in EPS by 8% and a slight stock’s price recover on 19th February, the P/E ratio reached 
$115.36. Generally, higher P/E ratios certify that external investors are expecting higher earnings 
progress on a long-term way. However, it might be useful to compare the P/E ratio of a company to 
those of other companies that play in the same industry: indeed, each industry has a different 
growth perspective. As for Facebook’s acquisition case, a rising stock price certifies a higher P/E 
ratio, while a falling stock price certifies a lower P/E ratio. Finally, a change in EPS will also 
change company P/E ratio leading in turn to a change in the company’s stock price.  
Valuation per comparable firms  
One important method to assess the value of a company is the “Comparably Company Analysis” or 
CCA. This is a process mainly focused on performing the value of a company under other 
enterprises (sometimes defined as benchmarks) that have a similar size tied to the analyzed 
company positioned in the same industry. CCA operates through the comparison of companies’ 
valuation multiples, such as EV / EBITDA, EV / Revenue or EV / User. For many analysts, this is 




company under analysis is compared to similar public companies trading on a stock exchange 
which values them in real-time. The best advantages are represented by the fact that multiples 
provide a suitable framework in order to obtain fair judgments. Furthermore, they are robust tools, 
simple to adopt and their easier calculations make them a friendly method in order to assess the real 
firm’s value. Multiples focus on the key statistics that are always adopted by all the external 
investors. However, multiples have a short-term nature: they are based on historical data or short-
term forecasts. Indeed, valuations based on multiples might be distorted for long term perspectives. 
Finally, multiples tend to value minorities: multiples do not consider any form of control compared 
to what asserts the Discounting Cash Flow method. For this important reason, multiple’s valuation 
might be higher than DCF valuation. 
Twitter was worth $20.1 billion even though it got operating losses equal to $542 million in the last 
quarter of 2013. Similarly, Pandora worth $7.3 billion made losses of $18 million at the end of 
2013. Netflix worth $25.9 billion showed a price to earnings multiple set at 231.25X firm’s yearly 
earnings. LinkedIn reached 871.48X and was worth $23.5 billion. WhatsApp ($19 billion) placed its 
enterprise value among LinkedIn ($19.98 billion) and Twitter ($18.79 billion). (see Exhibit 6) 
Valuation per comparable transactions 
An other efficient approach is to compare similar firms’ transactions. Indeed, a “comparable 
transaction” considers the past sales performed by very similar companies. In addition, considering 
the market value of publicly traded firms which have identical business and financial models to the 
company under valuation, it may be a very suitable approach. Naturally, in order to reach a more 
accurate evaluation, it is preferable to rely to more comparable transactions.  
For WhatsApp, comparable acquisitions to consider were represented by Instagram, Snapchat and 




(being after rejected) $3 billion in order to purchase Snapchat. Finally, Yahoo offered $1.1 billion to 
obtain the control of Tumblr in 2013. In this sense, WhatsApp’s valuation had completely different 
values than its “comparable transactions”. At the time of WhatsApp’s purchase, Snapchat had 25-30 
million users that daily shared 400 million photos. Instagram only 55 million images per day. 
WhatsApp, taking into account its 50 billion messages and 500 million images shared per day, 
clearly exceeded the above mentioned competitors. The deal with Facebook was one of the biggest 
in the Internet Industry: it almost doubled what Microsoft paid for Skype ($8.5 billion) and it was 
roughly five times what Lenovo paid for Motorola to Google ($2.9 billion). (see Exhibits 7, 8) 
WhatsApp was valued 9.2% of Facebook’s market capitalization: making some comparisons, 
YouTube was valued 1.3% of Google’s market cap. and Android just 0.08%. Even Instagram, 
bought by Facebook, was only about 1% of Facebook’s market cap. and Snapchat (which Facebook 
tried to buy in 2013) was perceived to be valued roughly 2.5% of Facebook’s market capitalization.  
Valuation per users 
The last valuation type is based on the user base size. This kind of valuation mainly focuses on the 
assets that the takeover firm is going to gain as a consequent result of the M&A transaction.  
At the time of the acquisition with Facebook, WhatsApp had nearly twice Twitter’s active users by 
month, and roughly three times its active users by day. Facebook paid just half of Twitter’s market 
capitalization. Facebook market value of $173.5 billion on 19th February 2014 was equal to $130.15 
per user, given its existing monthly active user base of 1.23 billion. Given WhatsApp number of 
users at the time of the deal (450 million), Facebook paid about 42 times WhatsApp’s user base or 
$42.2 per customers. Making a confrontation, Softbank’s acquisition of Supercell valued each user 
at about $100 (Supercell was vaued $3 billion), and considering an other time Facebook attempt to 




3) DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
WhatsApp’s valuation (performed on Section 2, through its business and financial model) reached 
$22.40 billon. Now, by assuming that analysts might have been more bearish on predicting 
WhatsApp’s ARPU (for instance, in 2022 and 2023 it will continue to set at $2.50) through an 
EBIT margin of 55% in 2023, and, by considering that the percentage of paying users will remain 
constant in the last estimated two years (80%), the company valuation might reach about $16.78 
billion. This means that Facebook could have overpaid WhatsApp. The main consequences on this 
assessment might lead to think that Facebook’s EPS was dilutive on the keydays following the deal 
due to the just mentioned overvaluation of the target firm, or even worse, that the company held by 
Jan Koum can not reach high revenues on the next years. Furthermore, this different scenario shows 
how the valuation is quite sensitive to the ARPU level. Analyzing Facebook’s shareholders, could a 
possible WhatsApp’s overpayment negatively affect their share’s value in the long-term period? 
Furthermore, it is deeply important to analyze the deal from an external investors perspective along 
a point of view which mainly focuses over the next years. What are the main risks associated by 
operating on a poor diversified industry? And what about “playing” alone in the Global Internet 
Media Industry without facing valuable competitors anymore? What can a lack of integration 
between Facebook and WhatsApp respective services cause in the future? Could Facebook 
seriously collapse over the next years by continuing to hold overvalued shares? 
In addition, can $19 billion be considered reasonable analyzing the main WhatsApp’s comparables?  
Finally, Facebook, through WhatsApp acquisition, showed that it can seriously “peak” over the next 
years: this means that the company is not able anymore to produce any fresh idea which may have a 
considerable commercial impact within the Global Internet Media Industry: actually, this should 








FORECAST INDUSTRY       
 
MACRO       
         Total Advertising Revenues 2014 2015 2016 
 
Global Population (M) 2013 2012 2011 
Global Revenues ($M) 545,434 575,785 605,878 
 
Internet Users (M) 2,749 2,497 2,273 
     
Internet Penetration (%) 38,7 35,6 32,7 
 
 
INDUSTRY         
 
INDUSTRY         
           Total Advertising Revenues 2014 2013 2012 2011 
 
Internet Ad Revenues by Region ($M) 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Global Ad Revenues ($M) 519,858 494,579 476,113 458,676 
 
North America 51,2 45,462 39,658 34,533 
U.S. Ad revenues ($M) 189,514 181,212 178,538 173,789 
 
EMEA 39,235 35,248 31,611 28,044 
      
Asia-Pacific 41,285 33,57 27,431 21,307 
      
Latin America 5,047 4,145 3,455 2,879 
 
 
MARKET SHARE       
 
MARKET SHARE         
          Internet Advertising Revenues 2013 2012 2011 
 
Internet Advertising Revenues 2014 2013 2012 2011 
U.S. Internet Advertising Revenues ($M) 42,781 36,57 31,735 
 
Global Internet Advertising Revenues ($M) 100 100 100 100 
Google Inc 26,768 23,502 17,56 
 
Google Inc   48,5 49 48,3 
Yahoo! Inc 3,481 3,461 3,303 
 
Yahoo! Inc   4,5 5,6 6,6 
Facebook Inc 3,173 2,067 1,583 
 
Facebook Inc   6,7 4,8 4,2 
2 
    
AOL   1,5 1,6 1,7 
     
IAC Interactive Corp   1,5 1,6 1,4 
     
Baidu Inc   5 4 3 
     
NHN Corp   1,2 1,2 1,3 
 
                                                          








FACEBOOK'S QUARTER REPORTS 2014             
        Facebook 1st quarter 2014 (in $ million) 
 
Facebook 2nd quarter 2014 (in $ million) 
 






Gross Profit 2040 
 
Total costs and expenses 2437 
 






Net income  642 
 
Net income  791 
 
Net income  806 
Weighted average of shares   
 
Weighted average of shares   
 











EPS basic 0,25 
 
EPS basic 0,31 
 
EPS basic 0,31 
EPS diluted 0,25 
 
EPS diluted 0,30 
 
EPS diluted 0,30 
P/E ratio 80,32 
 
P/E ratio 73,14 
 
P/E ratio 75,28 
Stock Price (in $) 60,24 
 
Stock Price (in $) 67,29 
 




FACEBOOK'S COMMON SHARES PRIOR TO THE ACQUISITION       
       
 
Class A common stock 2013 ($)* 
  
Class A common stock 2012 ($) 
 
            High                     Low 
  
            High                 Low 
First Quarter 32,51 24,72 
 
First Quarter     
Second Quarter 29,07 22,67 
 
Second Quarter 45 25,52 
Third Quarter 51,6 24,15 
 
Third Quarter 32,88 17,55 
Fourth Quarter 58,58 43,55 
 
Fourth Quarter 28,88 18,8 
4
 
* Class A common stock is traded on the Nasdaq Global Select Market since May 18, 2012 




                                                          
3 Source: Facebook 1st, 2nd , 3rd  Quarter Reports 2014 









WHATSAPP BUSINESS & FINANCIAL MODEL                       
             
Parameter Unit                       
Year   2014 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Active Users mm 450 719 982 1218 1431 1623 1795 1950 2090 2216 2329 
New user Additions per Day mm   0,8 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 
% Paying %   20% 35% 45% 55% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 
Usage Charges per Annum $   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Average Revenue per paying User $   1 1 1,25 1,5 1,75 2 2,25 2,5 2,75 3 
Revenue $mm 20 143,8 343,7 685,13 1180,58 1846,16 2513 3290,63 4180 5179,9 6288,3 
(-) Hosting costs (assumed $0.50 per user)     71,9 171,85 274,05 393,53 527,48 628,25 731,25 836 941,8 1048,05 
(-) Salaries (assumed $250K per employee)     13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 13,75 
% Cash Expenses %   20% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
(-) Cash Expenses     28,76 85,93 171,28 295,14 461,54 628,25 822,66 1045 1294,98 1572,08 
Profit before Taxes $mm   29,39 72,18 226,04 478,16 843,40 1242,75 1722,97 2285,25 2929,38 3654,43 
EBITDA Margin %   0,20 0,21 0,33 0,41 0,46 0,49 0,52 0,55 0,57 0,58 
(-) Taxes 35%   10,29 25,26 79,12 167,35 295,19 434,96 603,04 799,84 1025,28 1279,05 
Profit after Taxes $mm   19,10 46,91 146,93 310,80 548,20 807,79 1119,93 1485,41 1904,09 2375,38 
(-) Incremental Working Capital 10%   12,38 32,37 34,14 49,55 66,56 66,68 77,76 88,94 99,99 110,84 
(-) Capital Expenditures 5%   7,19 17,19 34,26 59,03 92,31 125,65 164,53 209 259 314,42 
Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF) $mm   -0,47 -2,64 78,53 202,23 389,34 615,45 877,64 1187,48 1545,11 1950,12 
Terminal Growth Rate % 5%                     
Discount Rate % 10%                     
Terminal Value $mm                     43381,93 
PV of FCFF $mm     -2,41 65,23 153,10 268,65 387,05 503,04 620,33 735,65 846,23 
(+) PV of TV $mm                     18825,08 














P/E RATIO EPS 
18 February 2014 93,84 0,72 
19 February 2014 115,36 0,59 
20 February 2014 118,02 0,59 
 





COMPANIES' VALUATION PER COMPARABLE FIRMS IN INTERNET SPACE AT THE TIME OF FACEBOOK-WHATSAPP'S DEAL 
  
Company Market Cap (in $M) 
Enterprise 
Value Revenues  EBITDA Net Income Number of users (in M) EV/User EV/Revenue EV/EBITDA  P/E ratio 
Facebook 173540 160090 7870 3930 1490 1230 130,15 20,34 40,74 116,47 
Linkedin 23530 19980 1530 182 27 277 72,13 13,06 109,78 871,48 
Twitter 20130 18790 665 -542 -645 243 77,33 28,26 Not available Not available 
Pandora 7320 7150 665 -18 -29 73,4 97,41 10,92 Not available Not available 
Groupon 6690 5880 2440 125 -95 43 136,74 2,41 47,04 Not available 
Netflix 25900 25380 4370 277 112 44 576,82 5,81 91,62 231,25 
Yelp 6200 5790 233 2,4 -10 120 48,25 24,85 2412,5 Not available 
OpenTable 1720 1500 190 63 33 14 107,14 7,89 23,81 52,12 




 Class A common stock 2014 (in $) 
 
              
High 
                
Low Closing Price 
January 2, 2014 63,37 51,85 62,57 
February 3, 2014 71,44 60,7 68,46 
February 18, 2014 67,54 66,07 67,3 
February 19,2014 ** 69,08 67 68,06 
February 20, 2014 70,11 65,73 69,63 
February 21, 2014 69,96 68,45 68,59 
February 24, 2014 71,44 68,54 70,78 
February 25, 2014 71 69,45 69,85 
March 3, 2014 72,59 57,98 60,24 
April 1, 2014 63,91 54,66 59,78 
May 1, 2014 64,3 56,26 63,3 
June 2, 2014 68 61,79 67,29 









COMPANIES' VALUATION PER COMPARABLE TRANSACTIONS IN INTERNET SPACE 
 
COMPANIES' VALUATION PER USER IN INTERNET SPACE 
        Target Company Acquiring Company Amount (in $ bn) Date 
 
Company Amount (in $ mm) Date 
Time Warner AOL 164 January, 2000 
 
Spotify 167,70 November, 2013 
Compaq HP 25 Sept, 2001 
 
Twitter 144 December, 2013 
WhatsApp Facebook 19 February, 2014 
 
Facebook 126,4 December, 2013 
Motorola Mobility Google 12,5 August, 2011 
 
Supercell 100 November, 2013 
Autonomy HP 10,24 August, 2011 
 
Snapchat 92,3 November, 2013 
Skype Microsoft 8,50 May, 2011 
 
WhatsApp 42,2 February, 2014 
Sun Microsystems Oracle 7,4 April, 2009 
 
YouTube 33 October, 2006 
Nokia Microsoft 7,2 Sept, 2013 
 
Instagram 28,6 April, 2012 
Broadcast.com Yahoo 5,7 April, 1999 
 
Skype 12,8 May, 2011 
Motorola (controlled by Google) Lenovo 2,9 January, 2014 
    YouTube Google 1,65 October, 2006 
    PayPal eBay 1,5 June, 2002 
    Tumblr Yahoo 1,1 May, 2013 
    Instagram Facebook 1 April, 2012 
    
 
 
     
   
EXHIBIT 8 
 
COMPANIES' VALUATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE ACQUISITION 
 
COMPANIES' USER NUMBERS AT THE TIME OF THE ACQUISITION 
     Company Amount (in $ billion) 
 









FB (Mobile) 945 
Yahoo 39,28 
 
FB (Mobile Only) 296 
Facebook 173,5 
 




   
Twitter (Mobile) 184 
   
Instagram 150 






5) DISCUSSION NOTE 
Risk of the deal 
There are some concerns that suggest that Facebook might collapse over the next years. One 
possible hypothesis may be represented to not having competitors anymore in the industry in which 
Facebook operates. After it bought its main rival, Facebook, by destroying any form of  competition 
around it, is ready to walk alone in the Global Internet Media Industry. But, as shown by empirical 
researches, competition leads customers’ choices among different services that an industry can 
provide them: competition between different companies that play in the same industry drives future 
stock market performances: based on an analysis of about 670 U.K. companies, the higher the 
number of competitors, wider is the rate of productivity growth that it may be obtained5. 
Another risk that can affect Facebook in a long-term perspective is due to lack of diversification. 
The latter allows investors to reduce firm-specific risk exposure during their asset allocation. By 
acquiring WhatsApp, Facebook can not ensure diversification to investors anymore: the latter may 
not consider Facebook and its poorly diversified industry, in their portfolio selection over the future. 
Thirdly, a large portion of long-term risk for Facebook is due by the overvaluation of its stock 
prices. The overvaluation made by the acquiring company on its shares can lead the latter to suffer 
lower long-run expected stock returns, aggravated by worse operating performances.6 The best 
example to support this assessment was represented by Netflix. Netflix’s stock increased roughly 
153% in 12 months from February 2013 to February 2014, and, on the first week of March 2014, it 
was trading at over $450 a share. On the middle of October 2014, it reached the lowest level in its 
history, after it slumped more than 20% from 15th October 2014 to 17th October 2014. Stocks that 
                                                          
5  Nickell Stephen. 1996. “Competition and Corporate Performance”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.104, No. 4, 724-746




seem extremely overpriced presage to a dizzying fall, and consequently lead to poor long-term 
expected returns. Netflix and Facebook are quite overvalued within their trading industry. 
Finally, an other cause of concern for Facebook over the next years can be due to a failure of 
integrating WhatsApp into its main products and offerings: lot of Facebook’s customers use the 
social network just to send and receive messages without paying any fee, and most of Facebook’s 
users are WhatsApp’s users as well. Now days, WhatsApp repesents a real time mobile service 
faster than Facebook. A missed integration among the two services can lead Facebook’s costumers 
to leave their account in the long-term period. In May 2011, Microsoft bought Skype for $8.5 
billion. Two years after, there were no signs that Skype generated a positive impact within 
Microsoft. The integration of Skype into all Microsoft’s business was difficoult, and it led to a huge 
amount of dollar billion less in Microsoft’s bank accounts and lot of users lost, after Skype joined it. 
A critical and professional analysis of the deal 
The main conclusion of this research project refers to the idea that WhatsApp was undervalued by 
Facebook. Even in the hypothesis of a lower ARPU level (mentioned in Section 3), the user number 
and engagement rate are still the dominant drivers: Facebook boasted 556 million mobile active 
users per day on 19th February 2014, whereas WhatsApp had already reached 450 million active 
daily users. Considering the issue related to long-term shareholders value described on Section 3, 
even with an hypothesis of WhatsApp’s overvaluation (which considers $16.78 billion instead of 
$19 billion as the fair transaction value), Facebook’s long-term shareholders value would be even 
positive (+1.26%). Thereby, the amount generated by the synergy ($3.38 billion), after tax 
breakeven income ($2.94 billion) and Facebook’s long-term shareholders value (+2.53%) are the 
main proofs to support the assessments above. The low Facebook’s EPS performance (it went down 




other factors. Since EPS refers to the ratio between a company’s net income (after have subtracting 
dividends on preferred stocks) and its number of shares outstanding, holding the former stable, the 
latter has widely increased due to the need of financing the deal through an issue of 230 million 
shares. Stocks’ overvaluation significantly contributed to dilute EPS on the keydays following the 
agreement. The latter definitely cancels out two different critical scenarios: the first one which was 
referred to the hypothesis that WhatsApp was overpaid by Zuckerberg, whereas the second one 
linked to the idea which believes that WhatsApp can not realize significant profits over the years. 
This consequently leads to two important conclusions: the first one that states Zuckerberg was 
definitely smart by overvaluing its shares because it allowed him in turn to keep on the table a huge 
amount of money to allocate for purchasing WhatsApp. On the other hand, Facebook’s stockholders 
probably will be not able anymore to sell their shares in the market due to their overprice. Also, 
Koum, even if he has the power to sell Facebook’s shares at any time he prefers (“lock-up-shares” 
period is only applicable to the IPO, not to M&A transactions), will be penalized in a long-term run.  
Looking to the respective enterprise values, WhatsApp’s comparable multiples were definitely 
Twitter and LinkedIn. Taking into account the huge amount of WhatsApp’s users (450 million, 
more than LinkedIn and Twitter, and only below Facebook) and, although unknown, its positive net 
income on 19th February 2014 compared to the negative’s showed by Twitter (-$645 million), on a 
valuation per comparable firms, the price tag would be fair. However, looking to the dollar amounts 
paid on WhatsApp’s comparable transactions, $19 billion seems quite high: the mitigating factor is 
represented by the 50 billion messages and 500 million images shared per day, unthinkable for the 
other companies under analysis. Conversely, through a valuation per users, $19 billion seems low: 
on 19th February 2014, Facebook’s enterprise value was almost eight times more than WhatsApp’s, 
while the price paid per each respective user was only three times more in favor of Facebook. Even 
Supercell and Snapchat, both evaluated $3 billion each, had a price per user more than $90 billion. 
